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We examine the effects of differences in social capital on first and second best transfers to 
families with children, in an asymmetric information context where the number of births, and 
the future earning capacity of each child that is born, are random variables. The probability 
that a couple has children is conditional on the level of reproductive activity undertaken. The 
probability that a child will have high earning ability is positively conditioned not only by the 
level of educational investment undertaken by the child’s parents, but also by the social 
capital of the latter. The optimal policy includes two transfers, one conditional on number of 
births, the other on the children’s earning ability. 
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Given that the number and well-being of future adults is conditioned by
actions taken by their parents, is there any reason why the government
should try to in￿ uence those actions? There are two lines one can take.
One is to grant citizenship to potential as well as actual human beings.
The other is to recognize as citizens only persons who actually exist. If
one takes the ￿rst line, the usual equity-e¢ ciency arguments for public
intervention apply not only to actual, but also to potential human beings.
If one takes the second line, these arguments apply only to actual per-
sons, and imply that a policy is desirable only if it increases the welfare
of the latter. Potential persons then matter only insofar and inasmuch
as, for altruistic or egoistic reasons, their parents have their well-being
at heart. Given the philosophical di¢ culties involved in treating indi-
viduals who may or may not come into being and whose characteristics
are uncertain on a par with actual persons (Broome, 1993), that is the
line we shall take in the present paper.
The questions we pose here have been addressed many times before
in the literature,1 but the authors (present ones included) addressing
them make one or both of two questionable assumptions. One is that
parental actions (e.g., educational investment) a⁄ecting the productiv-
ity or, more generally, the welfare of future adults are observable by the
government. This assumption ignores the fact that certain dimensions
of parental activity are either impossible or extremely costly for a public
authority to monitor, and that a public subsidy intended for children
could thus end up as consumption for their parents. Even if parents are
altruistic towards their children, convexity of preferences does in fact im-
ply that any increase in family income, whatever its source, will increase
expenditure on all normal goods, including parental consumption.
The other questionable assumption concerns fertility determination.
Some papers assume that fertility is exogenous, others that it is perfectly
controlled by parents. Both extremes are unrealistic, and may lead to
incorrect policy prescriptions. Ignoring the fertility incentive e⁄ect of
child related subsidies will in fact lead the policy maker to overlook the
possibility that a policy intended to relieve child poverty might have
the opposite e⁄ect. The opposite assumption, that parents can directly
choose how many children to have, makes the action of procuring a
certain number of births coincide with the outcome. Since the latter is
observable, this assumption carries the distasteful implication that the
government can costlessly dictate how many children a couple should
1For a survey, see Cigno (2005).
2have by threatening a su¢ ciently large penalty if they do not.2
Our starting point is Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2003), where it
is assumed that the number of children is deterministically chosen by
parents, but a child￿ s future earning capacity is a random variable with
given density conditional on an unobservable parental action. Parents
are taken to be identical. Since the government will eventually observe
the earning capacity of children, but cannot observe the parental ac-
tion that conditioned it, and given that this action cannot be inferred
from the outcome, because the latter is partly the e⁄ect of chance, the
model has a principal-agent structure with the government in the role
of principal, and potential parents in that of agents.
In that paper, the justi￿cation for government intervention is that
(i) atomistic parents do not fully internalize the social bene￿t of produc-
ing future tax payers, and enhancing their earning capacity, (ii) unlike
parents, the government does not face any risk, because the number of
present and future tax payers is assumed large. Point (ii) does not require
much elaboration. Point (i) relates to one of the questions left unan-
swered by the optimum population literature,3 namely whether there is
a population externality, and the nature of the externality. Many of the
arguments used in this literature refer to general equilibrium e⁄ects that
do not apply in the partial equilibrium setting adopted by the paper in
question. In that paper as in the present one, the only possible external-
ities are ￿scal. Atomistic parents have no reason to consider the e⁄ects
of their reproductive behaviour, and of their educational investments, on
future government revenue. This gives rise to two positive externalities,
one concerning the number, the other the earning capacity of future tax
payers.
All of that remains true in the present paper, but we extend the
analysis in two important directions. One is to drop the assumption of
perfect fertility control. We now treat the number of births as a random
variable, with given density conditional on the reproductive behaviour
of potential parents (the same is done by Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau
in another chapter of the present volume). We assume, in other words,
that what parents-to-be can choose is not the actual number of children,
but the probability of having 0, 1, 2, ... children. Since reproductive
behaviour, unlike the number of births, is clearly not observable by the
government, the latter cannot oblige parents to have any speci￿ed num-
2In principal-agent language, this is called a ￿ forcing contract￿ , and can be applied
whenever an action is observable (or inferrable) by the principal. In a population
policy context, it has a sinister ring.
3See Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), Michel and Pestieau (1993), Peters (1995),
Razin and Sadka (1995), and Sinn (2004).
3ber of children. This gives rise to a moral hazard problem, analogous to
the one associated with the non observability of educational investment.
The other extension is to assume that parents di⁄er in their ability to
in￿ uence their children￿ s probability of success in life. This introduces a
redistributive motive for public intervention, in addition to those asso-
ciated with externality and insurance considerations.
In reality, di⁄erences in parental ability to in￿ uence a child￿ s proba-
bility of success may re￿ ect di⁄erences in a variety of parental character-
istics. An obvious one is parental income. If it is not possible to borrow
against a child￿ s expected future earnings, rich parents will tend to in-
vest more than poor ones in their children￿ s education. Since a child￿ s
education does not begin and end at school, another obviously relevant
characteristic is parental ability to instill in their children the pleasure
of learning, work ethics, etc. Di⁄erences in this kind of ability will lead
to di⁄erences in the marginal cost of providing a child with any given
level of earning capacity. The e⁄ects of di⁄erences in parental income on
the design of policy are examined by Cremer, Dellis and Pestieau (2003)
in an exogenous fertility setting. Those of ability to produce earners
versus ability to earn are examined by Balestrino, Cigno and Pettini
(2002) and Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2004), the former in an optimal
taxation, the latter in a principal-agent framework, but both under the
assumption of deterministic fertility choice. Ability to earn and ability
to educate children are dimensions of parental human capital. Here, we
focus on another di⁄erentiating parental characteristic, social capital,
and examine its so far unexplored ￿scal implications.
At least since Stigler (1962), economists have been aware of the value
of information regarding career opportunities. Social networks appear
to be an important source of this kind information. Granovetter (1991)
reports that as much as half the jobs are allocated through them. But,
information is not all that social networks provide. Durlaf (2001) puts
forward a "memberships theory of poverty", according to which a child
whose parents belong to an underprivileged social group "grows up in a
poor community whose role models and peer groups militate against eco-
nomic success, and subsequently ￿nds himself in a series of poor schools
and jobs". In a context where the areas of residence are not rigidly seg-
regated according to income and social status, the term "community"
need not have a geographical connotation. Irrespective of place of resi-
dence, children of professional parents are in fact likely to have friends
who spend many hours a day doing their homework. The opportunity-
cost of education is likely to be lower for children with this kind of peer
group than for the rest. When they grow up, children of this kind are
also more likely to have the information and personal connections that
4will help them to get a good job, and to advance in their career.
This interactions-based approach to modelling social in￿ uences on
individual behaviour lends operational content to the otherwise elusive
concept of social capital. In the present paper, we assume that parents
di⁄er in their endowment of this kind of capital. Allowing parents to dif-
fer also in some dimension of their human capital would not make any
qualitative di⁄erence if this were either uncorrelated, or positively cor-
related with social capital. It would make a di⁄erence if the correlation
were negative, but that does not seem very plausible where the earn-
ing ability dimension of human capital is concerned. We shall further
assume that social capital is positively correlated with visible parental
characteristics such as occupation, and perhaps place of residence, and
that it is thus inferable by the government.
Our modelling strategy bears similarities to the Principal Multi-
Agent approach of Holmstr￿m (1982), but we depart from this author in
two, not entirely secondary, respects. First, we do not assume that the
interests of the principal are diametrically opposed to those of the agents
(in our model, the government maximizes the sum of the objective func-
tions of the parents). Second, our model has a dynamic programming
structure. The (privately and the socially) optimal choice of reproduc-
tive behaviour is determined by backward induction, after solving for the
(privately and the socially) optimal educational investment conditional
on number of children actually born.
2 The model
To simplify matters, we assume that there are only two types of parents,
A or B, and many couples of each type (otherwise, they could collude to
in￿ uence government policy). The former are ￿ more productive￿than
the latter in the precise sense that, for any amount of formal and in-
formal education imparted on a child, the cumulative probability that
the variable representing the child￿ s economic success does not exceed a
certain value is everywhere higher if the parents are of type B, than if
they are of type A. We attribute this di⁄erence to the fact that type A
has more social capital than type B:
This does not imply that a child of type-B parents cannot do better
than a child of type-A parents, but it does imply that, for any given
level of parental investment in the child￿ s education, the expectation of
success is higher for the latter than for the former.4 Assuming that the
4A type-B couple could turn itself into an A by investing in its own education,
or changing place of residence. But changing type absorbs parental resources that
could otherwise be invested in children. Therefore, the initial status of the parents
unavoidably conditions the chances of success of the children. We shall assume that
5amount a person pays in taxes over a lifetime increases monotonically
with that person￿ s lifetime income, we measure a person￿ s success in life
as capacity to pay taxes. We further assume that neither a child, nor a
parent, can borrow against future income. By contrast, the government
can borrow against future tax revenue.
The problem has the following time structure. At date 1, couple i
takes an action, bi, that will condition the probability distribution of the
number of births. We interpret this action as reproductive activity. At
date 2, the number of children born to couple i, ni, is revealed to all
concerned. Couple i then takes another action, ai, that will condition
the probability distribution of their children￿ s future tax-paying capacity,
xi. We interpret this second action as education in the broadest sense.
At date 3, a child￿ s tax paying capacity is revealed. Parents choose
ai and bi taking government policy as given. The policy consists of a
general income tax, and two transfers, si and yi. The ￿rst transfer is
payable at date 2. The second is a per-child subsidy payable at date 3.
Assuming that all future citizens will make a positive tax contribution,
both transfers can be taken to be nonnegative. The government chooses
the si (:) and yi (:) schedules taking the income tax as given. Both the
government and the parents apply backward induction.
Let Ci
t denote i￿ s consumption at date t (t = 1;2;3). Ex-post, i￿ s





















where Ut (:) is increasing and strictly concave. If the couple is altruistic,
Ci
3 will include not only market goods, but also the income-equivalent of
the utility that they derive from their children￿ s success in life. Denote
by w(ai) the per-child cost of action ai,5 and by c(ni) that part of the
cost of i￿ s children that does not depend on ai. Assuming that, at date t,
all couples have the same after-tax income, mt,6 the budget constraints
facing couple i are then
C
i
1 = m1; (2)
C
i























the cost of changing type is prohibitively high.
5If the action includes investment of parental time, w(ai) includes an opportunity
cost, and m2 is then to be interpreted as full income.
6With more than two types, we would have said that income and social capital
are uncorrelated.
6The term z(xi) may be interpreted either as actual money that i expects
to receive from each child, conditionally on the child￿ s income,7 or as the
income-equivalent of the altruistic pleasure that couple i derives from a
child￿ s economic success. To ensure concavity, we take it that c(:) and
w(:) are increasing and strictly convex (increasing marginal costs), and





At date 2, agent (couple) i chooses how much to invest in each child￿ s
education, ai, taking the number of children, ni, and government policy,
as given. The principal (government) decides the structure of incentives
that a⁄ect an agent￿ s choice. We index actions and outcomes pertaining
to agent i by the superscript i. Where it is important to specify that the
agent is of a certain type, we indicate that by the subscript k = A;B.
We denote by ak = (ai
k); the vector of the actions taken by all agents of
type k, and by a = (aA;aB) the vector of the actions taken by all agents.
Similar conventions are adopted with respect to all other actions and
outcomes.
The outcome, xi, depends on an action, ai, known only to i, and on
a random variable, ￿
i (fortune, genetic inheritance), with given density.
The realization of ￿
i is not observable, but its density function is com-
mon knowledge. We assume that the elements of ￿ are independently
distributed. Following Mirrlees (1974), we treat xi itself as a random
variable, with density fi(xi;ai). We assume that the support of xi is the
same for all i, and that the density function is the same for all the agents
of the same type. The joint density f(x;a) is then equal to
Q
i fi(xi;ai):
We measure xi as the present value, at date 2, of the taxes that each
of i0s children will pay in adult life. The action ai is so de￿ned, that the
cumulative distribution of xi associated with a higher value of ai ￿rst-
order stochastically dominates the one associated with a lower value of





increasing in xi, and that the cumulative distribution of xi is convex
in ai. These conditions justify using the ￿rst-order conditions derived
from the agent￿ s decision problem as incentive-compatibility constraints
in the present multi-agent setting.8
7Cigno (1993, 2005) derives conditions under which it is in the interest of non-
altruistic adults to make such payments to their elderly parents.
8These are the standard Monotone Likelihood Ratio and Convexity of the Distri-
bution Function conditions that allow one to use the ￿rst-order approach in a single
7Let Xi denote the set of possible outcomes for agent i, and X the
Cartesian product of all the Xi sets. Similarly, let Xi
A and Xi
B denote
the sets of possible outcomes for agents of type A and B respectively
(but remember that the set is the same for both types). We assume
that, if i is of type A, and j of type B, the marginal distribution of xi




B, the probability that xi
A is no less than a certain value,
is always higher than the probability that x
j
B is no less than that same
value.
The assumption that, on average, one type is more productive than
the other does not necessarily imply that, for any given level of the
action, the expected marginal product of the action is higher for an A






















but we assume that to be the case nonetheless. This is equivalent to









































2 is determined by (3), and Ci
3 by (4). Let n￿i be a vector, each
element of which represents the number of children born to agents other
than i, so that n = ( ni;n￿i). At this stage, couples are distinguished
only by type and number of children, both of which are observable by
government. The date-3 per-child government transfer payable to couple
i, yk (xi;ni;n￿i), will depend on i￿ s type (k = A;B), and on how many
children i and everyone else has. It may also be conditional on xi.9
Anticipating a result that will be obtained when we examine date-1
agent setting. Luporini (2004) establishes general conditions for the applicability
of that approach in a multi-agent context. Given the assumption that the random
variables are independent, MLR and CDF ensure that those conditions are satis￿ed.
9In principle it could be conditional on the entire vector x; but we know from
Holmstr￿m (1982) that independence of the random variables implies that the com-
pensation is a function of one￿ s own outcome. This will also be our result in section
3:2.
8decisions, we assume that the date-2 transfer to agent i depends on how
many children i and the other couples have, sk (ni;n￿i).
At date 2, i has already cashed sk (ni;n￿i), but is yet to receive






























j)dx = 0; (7)
tells us that the marginal cost of ai will be equated to the expected
marginal bene￿t, expressed in terms of xi:
3.2 Principal
Let us now look at matters from the point of view of the principal (the
government). We assume that its objective function is the sum of those























At date 2, the government has already chosen and announced the transfer
schedules sk (:;:). Since the number of children that each couple has is
now known, couple i must now be paid sk (ni;n￿i). The policy problem
is then to choose the date-3 transfer schedules yk (:;ni;n￿i).
Having assumed that the number of agents of each type (hence, the
total number of future tax payers) is ￿ large￿ , we may write the intertem-























where si (;::) and yi(:;:;:) are to be interpreted as the transfer schedules
applicable to an agent of i￿ s type (A or B) at, respectively, date 2 and
date 3.10






xinif(x;a)dx, must be large enough to cover both the ex-






yi (xi;ni;n￿i)nif(x;a)dx; and the actual value of the trans-
fers that the government is committed to pay at date 2,
P
i si (ni;n￿i).
The child generation is thus required to ￿nance both types of transfer to
10That avoids us summing ￿rst over agents of the same type, and then over types.
9the parent generation. In the same way, the parent generation will have
been required to pay for transfers to the grandparent generation. In a
sense, therefore, the government acts as an intergenerational intermedi-
ary.
Couple i take into account the e⁄ect of their action on their chil-
dren￿ s future earning ability only insofar and inasmuch as it a⁄ects the
couple￿ s own utility via z (:). Being one of many, the couple has in fact
no reason to take into account the e⁄ect of ai on the government budget
constraint. We have thus a positive externality. Since ai is not observ-
able, the government will then make the date-3 transfer conditional on
the outcome, xi.
The date-2 policy problemis to choose the transfer schedules, yA (:;ni;n￿i)
and yB (:;ni;n￿i), so as to maximize (8), subject to the government
budget constraint (9), and to an incentive-compatibility constraint (7)
for each agent. There is no need for participation constraints because,
with the number of children given, agents cannot escape the government
scheme by deciding not to have children.11 Being a parameter in the
principal￿ s budget constraint, the fertility vector n is also a parameter
in the transfer schedule yk (:;ni;n￿i), and a determinant of the vector of
actions a. We can thus write ai (n) for the chosen value of ai.
The ￿rst-order conditions on the choice of the yA and yB schedules
tell us that, for each possible realization of x, the per-child transfer to
























ai = 0; (10)
where ￿ is the Lagrange-multiplier of the government budget constraint,
measuring the marginal social utility of expected tax revenue, and ￿i
the Lagrange-multiplier of the i-th incentive-compatibility constraint,
measuring the marginal social utility of relaxing this constraint.








































11Another way the agents could avoid participating in the government scheme is
by voting it (or the government that proposes it) down. However, the presence of a
positive externality ensures that the median agent will have higher utility with, than
without the policy. Therefore, the participation constraints will not be binding in
any case.







































the e⁄ect on the government budget constraint (the externality),12 If, as
we will ￿nd in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, yj (xj;ni;n￿i) does not depend on







































































is the e⁄ect on i￿ s incentive-compatibility constraint (negative for the
agent￿ s second-order conditions).
3.2.1 First best
Suppose, for a moment, that the principal can observe parental actions,
a. Under this assumption, the incentive-compatibility constraints are
not binding (￿i = ￿j = 0). As (10) reduces to
U
0
3 = ￿; (16)
date-3 consumption is then equalized across agents and states of nature.
Therefore, the ￿rst-best solution achieves perfect equity, and provides
parents with full insurance. The latter is a common ￿rst-best property.
In the standard principal-agent problem, however, the property arises
from the assumption that the principal is less risk-averse than the agent.
Here, by contrast, the principal is as risk-averse as any (maximizes the
sum of the utility functions) of the agents. The result arises, in our case,
from the fact that the principal is able to spread risks, while individual
agents on their own cannot.
A ￿rst best can be implemented by choosing the payment schedules












is to be interpreted as the transfer to an agent of j￿ s type
(A or B) who had nj children.
11As this implies that date-3 transfers do not depend on type, we may
write the amount due to agent i as y￿ (xi;ni;n￿i).
In this setting, (11) reduces to
D
i + ￿E




















the ￿nding that U0
3 must be equal to ￿, and that (xj ￿ yj (xj;nj;n￿j))
is constant with respect to fi

































































in view of (17). This tells us that, for each agent i, the marginal cost of
the action has to be equated to the expected marginal social bene￿t.
In the next section, we shall ￿nd that the ￿rst-best U0
2 (Ci
2) is inde-
pendent of ni. Anticipating that result, and given that U0
3 is equal to ￿,
we deduce from (19) that, for any given fertility vector n, the ￿rst-best
action is the same for all agents of the same type, irrespective of how
many children they themselves happen to have, and larger for agents of
type A than for agents of type B: In other words, better connected par-
ents must invest more in the education of each child that they happen
to have. Denoting by a￿




A (n) > a
￿
B (n): (20)
Notice that the level of the per-child educational investment required
of any couple depends on the total number of children, and on how many
of these children were born to type-A couples. Since the government￿ s
future revenue increases with the number of future tax payers, and with
the proportion of these tax payers who enjoy a high income, it then
follows that the relative importance of the future tax contribution made
by each couple￿ s children will vary inversely with the share in this total
of children born to type-A couples.
On the other hand, the higher the tax revenue, the higher the trans-
fer, and the lower consequently U0
3 (Ci
3) for each i. Since the left-hand
12side of (19) is increasing, and the right-hand side decreasing in ai, the
￿rst-best level of that variable is then a decreasing function of govern-
ment revenue. It thus follows that, the greater the proportion of children
born to well connected parents, the lower the level of the educational in-
vestment required of each couple. This also implies that, other things
being equal, a￿
k (ni;n￿i)will be decreasing in ni if i has a high level of
social capital (k = A), increasing if i has a low level of social capital
(k = B).
Let us see what we can say about the direction of the redistribu-
tion. Consider ￿rst the case where parents have no direct interest in the
economic success of their children, z(xi) ￿ 0. In the absence of policy,
all parents would then have the same utility. Yet, (17) tells us that all
couples get the same transfer irrespective of type, and of their children￿ s
success in life. The ￿rst-best subsidy thus re-distributes in favour of
parents with lower social capital, in the sense that these parents receive
more (and those with higher social capital receive correspondingly less)
in subsidies than the actuarial value of the taxes that their children are
expected to pay. Why?
The reason is simply that children from type-A families generate, on
average, more tax revenue than children with type-B backgrounds. Since
the combination of a Benthamite social welfare function with a concave
utility function implies that marginal utilities are equalized across indi-
viduals and states of nature, it then follows that everybody must get the
same per-child subsidy. Parents with low social capital will thus get out
of the system more than they (or, rather, their children) put in. This
di⁄erentiates ours from most optimal taxation models, where ￿rst-best
redistribution is generally in favour of households or individuals with
lower laissez-faire utility.
Now, suppose that parents have a direct interest in their children￿ s
future, z0(xi) > 0. There is then an additional reason why a couple
might be subsidized, namely to insure them against the risk that their
children will be unsuccessful. The optimal per-child transfer to couple
i will thus be inversely related to the realization of xi, not for incentive
reasons (we are assuming that ai is observable), but to compensate them
of the psychic or monetary loss from having an unsuccessful child. As a
consequence, it will still be true that the ￿rst-best policy re-distributes
in favour of parents with lower social capital. Indeed, it will redistribute
more than if parents did not care about their children￿ s future. But, there
will now be also some within-type redistribution in favour of unlucky
parents.
133.2.2 Second best
Let us now go back to the more realistic assumption that the actions
taken by the parents are not observable by the government. The policy
must then satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraints. Since Di is
now zero, because the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding, (11)
tells us that the second-best policy induces i to invest time and money
in each child￿ s education up to the point where the incentive cost, ￿iF i,
is just compensated by the external e⁄ect (the welfare increase due to
the additional tax revenue), ￿Ei, generated by the induced increase in
ai. Given ni, ai is thus higher in ￿rst than in second best. In ￿rst
best, aA (ni;n￿i) was higher than aB (ni;n￿i). That is mostly, but not
always, the case in second best too. If it costs the government less to
give the incentive to the B than to the A type,13 the second-best policy
may induce well connected parents to choose a lower level of educational
investment than the rest. If the opposite is true, however, ak (ni;n￿i)
will be decreasing in the proportion of children born to parents with
high social capital. This again implies that, other things being equal,
ak (ni;n￿i) should be decreasing in ni for k = A, increasing in ni for
k = B.
Let us see what we can say about the second-best choice of policy
instruments. As in ￿rst best, the government￿ s future tax revenue in-
creases with the number of future tax payers, and with the proportion of
them who enjoy a high income. The per-child transfer due to i will thus
depend on the entire n vector. As in ￿rst best, it will increase with the
proportion of children who were born to parents with high social capital.
Since parental investments are not observable, it will depend also on xi.
How?












where, it should be remembered,
fi
ai
fi is increasing in xi and varies ac-
cording to i0s type. We have seen that, in ￿rst best, the date-3 transfer
schedule is the same for everyone. We have also seen that the per-child
transfer due to i varies with xi only if the latter is of direct interest to i.
In second-best, by contrast, there is a di⁄erent schedule for each type,
re￿ ecting the di⁄erent cost of giving a couple with high or low social cap-
ital the incentive to invest in their children￿ s education. Furthermore,
13The trade-o⁄ between productivity and incentive costs is examined in Kim
(1995), and Robbins and Sarath (1996).
14since ￿ is positive at an optimum, (21) tells us that agent i￿ s second-best
utility will vary with xi even if z (xi) ￿ 0.
If parents have no direct interest in their children￿ s success, yk (xi;ni;n￿i)
increases with xi. In that case, parents are rewarded in direct relation
to how well their children have done in adult life. Matters are more
complicated if parents have a direct interest in their children￿ s success












is increasing in xi, it follows from concavity of z(:) that yk (xi;ni;n￿i)
may be increasing or decreasing in xi. Since z0 (xi) is positive, and
decreasing in xi, the schedule is then likely to be U-shaped. Concerned
parents of either very unsuccessful or very successful children will likely
attract higher transfers ￿the former for insurance, the latter for incentive
reasons ￿than concerned parents of children of middling ability.
Notice that the di⁄erence between yA (xi;ni;n￿i) and yB (xi;ni;n￿i)
is only due to the need to satisfy (21). Apart from that, utility will
still tend to be equalized across types, because ￿ is the same for both.
This tells us that the need to provide parents with the incentive to
invest in their children￿ s education reduces the scope for redistributing
from parents with high, to parents with low social capital. If giving the
incentive to the former is no more costly than giving it to the latter, some
redistribution will still take place, but full equity will not be reached.
4 Date 1
Let the number of children born at date 2 to couple i, ni, depend on the
couple￿ s reproductive activity at date 1, bi, and on a random variable,
￿
i. In recognition of the fact that ni is a discrete variable, we write
its density, the same for all agents, as p(ni;bi): Obviously, the ￿
i and,
consequently, the ni are independently distributed. We can then write










We interpret bi as something (e.g., frequency of intercourse) that in-
creases the chances of having a large number of children. We thus as-
sume that the cumulative distribution of ni associated with a higher
value of bi ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the one associated with a
lower value of the same variable.
We also assume that p(ni;bi) satis￿es the standard Monotone Like-
lihood Ratio (
pbi(ni;bi)
p(ni;bi) increasing in bi), and Convexity of Distribution
Function, conditions. Among other things, these assumptions ensure the
15concavity of the agent￿ s expected utility with respect to bi (see footnote
8 above). Since, at this stage, agents di⁄er only in their social capital
endowment, agents of the same type behave the same. That is not true
at date 2, where agents are di⁄erentiated also by number of children.
4.1 Agents
We saw in the last section that, at date 2, a k-type couple chooses ai
taking ni, sk (ni;n￿i) and yk (:;ni;n￿i) as given. Since the government
choice of yk (xi;ni;n￿i), takes into account the vector of actual date-2
transfers, s(ni;n￿i), i￿ s date-2 choice is ultimately a function of how
many children they, and all other couples, happen to have. At date
1, couple i does not know how many children will be born at the date
2, nor what yk (xi;ni;n￿i) is going to be. All they know is the date-2
transfer schedule, sk (ni;n￿i). We shall assume that they hold rational
expectations about everyone else￿ s decisions.































N indicates a string of summations, one for each
agent. The term vi (ai (n;s(n))) represents the maximum value of (6),
given the realization of n. In other words, vi (ai (n;s(n))) is the expec-
tation at date 1 of the couple￿ s utility at date 3, on the assumption that,
at date 2, the couple will have chosen ai optimally, given government
policy and the number of children actually born.






























N￿i indicates a string of products, one for each
agent other than i. Condition (23) tells us that each couple will raise
their level of reproductive activity to the point where the expected mar-
ginal utility equals the current marginal cost. The latter is zero for the
assumption that, unlike educational investment, reproductive activity
costs nothing in itself.14 There are, however, expected costs (re￿ ected
in Ci
2 via c(ni)) arising from the possible realizations of ni.
14That is not true in the case of infertile couples, for whom reproductive activity
involves either expensive and perhaps unpleasant medical practices, or long and costly
adoption procedures. But nothing of substance changes if we make the marginal cost
of i￿ s reproductive activity an increasing function of bi.
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This di⁄ers from (9) in three respects.15 First, because ni and n￿i are still
random variables. Second, because the sk (:;:) schedules are yet to be
determined. Third, because the yk (:;ni;n￿i) schedules are determined
(as part of the solution of the date-2 policy problem).


































subject to (24), and to an incentive compatibility constraint (23) on the
choice of bi for each i.16 Since, at date 1, all agents of the same type
behave the same, the incentive compatibility constraint is the same for
all agents of the same type. That is also the reason why there are only
two date-2 transfer schedules, one for each type of couple.
As pointed out in subsection 4:1, the sk (:;:) schedules must be an-
nounced before the agents choose their reproductive behaviour. At date
2, i will in fact bear a cost, c(ni), that increases with the number of
children. In the absence of a transfer increasing with ni, the couple
would then choose, at date 1, too low a level of reproductive activity,
because they would not take into account the e⁄ect of their behaviour
on the government budget constraint. We have thus another external-
ity, similar to the one encountered at date 2. The latter concerned the
choice of a, given n, and was cured o⁄ering i a transfer conditional on
the realization of xi. The present one concerns the choice of b, and is
cured by promising each i a transfer conditional on the realization of ni.
































are to be interpreted as the transfer
schedules applicable to agents of i￿ s type.
16At this stage, there is no need for participation constraints because the externality
argument guarantees that the expected utility of both types of agent is higher than
it would be in the absence of the policy. No one will then opt out by not having
children.
17where ￿i is the Lagrange-multiplier of the incentive-compatibility con-
straint for agent i, (23), and ￿ the Lagrange-multiplier of the date-1










If either b or the realizations of ￿ were observable, we would have a











The ￿rst-best policy thus assures parents a given level of date-2 con-
sumption, independent of how many children they actually have. The
date-2 transfer s￿
k (ni;n￿i), increasing in ni, fully insures parents against
the risk of having too few, or too many, children.
Now, recall that a￿
k (n) is a determinant of Ci
2, and that s￿
k (ni;n￿i) is
thus dependent on the whole fertility vector, n. Recall, also, that a￿
A (n)
is greater than a￿
B (n) in view of (20). If ni = nj = no, where i is an
















This says that, in ￿rst best, a couple with more social capital will receive
a higher date-2 subsidy than a couple with the same number of children,
but lower social capital.
Since the actions are not observable, however, we have a moral hazard
problem. In second best, ￿i is positive for each i: Having assumed that
pbi(ni;bi)
p(ni;bi) is increasing in ni; and given that U
0
2(Ci
2) is decreasing in Ci
2,
it then follows from (27) that Ci
2 must increase with ni: We can see
from (3) that the direct e⁄ect of ni on Ci
2 is negative, but there is also
an indirect e⁄ect via ai: The second-best ai are increasing in ni for B
types and decreasing for A types. This implies that sB (ni;n￿i) is always
increasing in ni; while sA (ni;n￿i) may be decreasing if the indirect e⁄ect
of ni on Ci
2 dominates the direct e⁄ect. The second-best sA (ni;n￿i) is
thus likely to be increasing in ni at low family sizes, where Ci
2 is low,
but may ￿ atten out or start to decrease above a certain level of ni. In
other words, the government may want to discourage type-A parents
from having children above a certain maximum. That is not needed in
the case of type-B parents, because the date-2 incentive to invest in a
child￿ s education is not strong enough for this type of parent to induce
them to have too many children. The question obviously does not arise in
￿rst best, where behaviour is observable, and parents can thus be ordered
18to undertake the socially optimal level of reproductive activity (we have
already remarked on this distasteful implication of observability).
The ￿rst-order conditions on the principal￿ s choice of b are not very
enlightening. All we can deduce from them is that, in ￿rst best, parents
endowed with more social capital will be required to have more children.
That is not necessarily true in second best, however, because it may
cost the government too much to give parents with high social capital
the right incentives to invest in their children￿ s education. It is just
possible, therefore, that it will not be worthwhile to encourage type-A
parents with large social capital endowments to have many children.
5 Discussion
We have examined a situation where potential parents can condition (i)
the probability distribution of having 0, 1, 2 ... children through their
choice of reproductive activity, and (ii) the probability distribution of
their children￿ s future earning ability through their choice of educational
investment. We are assuming that the amount a child will pay in taxes
increases with the child￿ s future earning ability. We are also assuming
that, for any given amount of parental money and time spent on a child￿ s
upbringing, children of well connected parents have a higher probability
of landing a good job, and of advancing in their career, than children
with less favourable family backgrounds.
We have identi￿ed three motives for government intervention. The
￿rst motive arises from the presence of two externalities, one associ-
ated with reproductive behaviour, the other with educational invest-
ment. Both externalities re￿ ect the fact that atomistic couples have
no reason to take into account the e⁄ects of their decisions on future
government revenue. The second motive arises from insurance consid-
erations. Since parents face risks in relation to the number of children
that is born, and to the success that each of these children will have in
future life, while the government does not face any risk in relation to
its future revenue (because the total number of children is large), social
welfare may increase if the government insures parents. The third is an
equity motive. If they have a direct interest in their children￿ s future,
parents endowed with lower social capital have lower expected utility, in
the absence of policy, than couples endowed with higher social capital.
If parental actions were observable, the government would do two
things. First, it would order couples to undertake the ￿rst-best level of
reproductive activity, and the ￿rst-best level of educational investment
in each child that is born. The required level of both actions would be
higher for couples with high, than for couples with low social capital.
Second, it would use personalized lump-sum transfers to equalize mar-
19ginal utilities. The policy would thus achieve perfect equity. If parents
care about what will happen to their children in adult life, the policy
would achieve also full insurance.
In reality, however, parental actions are not observable, and cannot
be inferred from fertility and tax paying outcomes, because these are in
part the result of chance. As a consequence, the government can neither
tell a couple what to do in the bedroom, nor order them to devote a
certain amount of money and time to the education of their o⁄spring.
As the government must give parents the incentive to behave e¢ ciently
on both scores, the second-best policy will then achieve neither perfect
equity, nor full insurance. The second-best policy uses two instruments.
One is a subsidy, sk (ni;n￿i), payable as soon as i￿ s children are born.
For parents with low social capital, the size of this subsidy is everywhere
increasing in ni. For parents with high social capital, by contrast, it
may be increasing up to a certain level of ni, and constant or decreasing
beyond that. In other words, it may be desirable to discourage better
connected parents from having too many children. Such a disincentive
is not needed in the case of less well connected parents, because those
will be discouraged by increasing educational costs. We may interpret
this side of the policy as a child bene￿t scheme.
The other instrument is a per-child transfer, yk (xi;ni;n￿i), payable
as soon as the tax paying capacity of i￿ s children is revealed. Taking
it to be the norm that parents have a direct interest in their children￿ s
future, the size of this transfer is likely to be decreasing in xi up to
a certain point, and then increasing. Parents with children of normal
ability are thus likely to get less help from the government than parents
of children with either very low, or very high ability. To the extent that
school performance is a predictor of a child￿ s future earning ability, we
may interpret yk (xi;ni;n￿i) as a scholarship. Alternatively, since the
tax paying capacity of a couple￿ s children will become known only when
the latter are in middle life, and the former on the point of retirement,
we may interpret yk (xi;ni;n￿i)ni as the present value of i0s pension
entitlement.
Take the second interpretation. Although the money received by
currently retired citizens comes out of taxes paid by current workers,
this is not a conventional pay-as-you-go scheme. In the latter, the taxes
paid by current adults go into a common pool, and the pension that an
old person receives bears no relation to the tax-paying capacity of that
person￿ s children. As a consequence, the scheme does not give current
workers an incentive to produce future tax payers. Indeed, if pension
entitlements are related to own tax payments, it is an incentive to have
fewer children, and to invest as little time as possible in each of them.
20Here, by contrast, there is a direct relationship between the payment
that a retired person receives, and the taxes paid by that person￿ s own
children.17 We can think of this as either an alternative to a conventional
pension scheme, or an addition such that a working-age person has the
choice of qualifying for a pension by either paying pension contributions,
or producing future tax payers.
Social capital a⁄ects the expected social return to educational in-
vestment. If parents care for what will happen to their children in adult
life, it a⁄ects also the expected private return. The second-best policy
implications of di⁄erences in social capital endowments are not straight-
forward, because the policy maker must balance e¢ ciency with equity
and insurance considerations, and compare the cost of providing an in-
centive with the external e⁄ect of the resulting action. We ￿nd that,
other things being equal, the second-best policy redistributes in favour
of couples with lower social capital. Nonetheless, it generally encourages
better connected parents to have more children than less well connected
ones. Notice that the latter is not what happens in practice. In real-life
family support schemes, bene￿ts are either unrelated to parental char-
acteristics (depend only on number of children), or favour families with
lower social capital. That is dangerous, because it may encourage cou-
ples (and single mothers) with lower social capital to have more children
than the rest, and thus to increase rather than decrease the number of
underprivileged children.
Our results suggest that couples with low social capital should be
helped, as far as possible, using policy instruments that act as an in-
centive to invest in a child￿ s future achievements, rather than in num-
ber of children. Cigno and Pettini (2002) reach the same conclusion
in an indirect taxation framework. In the present framework, the in-
centive comes either from scholarships, contingent on a child￿ s scholastic
achievement, or pension entitlements, contingent on the children￿ s labour
market achievements. In either case, the "merit" element is tempered by
equity and insurance considerations.18 Parents, however, cannot wait for
the scholarship ￿even less for the pension ￿to arrive before they start
to invest in their children￿ s education. That is why parents must get the
other transfer as soon as the child is born.
17For redistributive and insurance reasons, however, the pension may be larger or
smaller than the taxes paid by the pensioner couple￿ s children.
18This makes a transfer system ￿nanced by a general income tax superior to indirect
taxation, but the latter may be cheaper to administer.
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